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Abstract 
 
An important contributor to cost overruns of infrastructure projects is contract 
changes after the construction contract has been concluded. Using mainly descriptive 
statistics and non-parametric tests, real project data were analyzed from forty-five 
Dutch transportation infrastructure projects with a total construction contract value 
of over € 8.5 billion. First it was explored if we could find evidence for the 
presumption that contractors bid low on contracts to recover the loss of bid profit by 
claiming contract change costs in the project implementation. We conclude that we 
could not find evidence for the opportunistic behavior of contractors. Second, the 
different sizes and reasons for the contract changes were explored. We conclude that: 
scope changes are the most significant reason for contract changes, followed by 
technical necessities; smaller projects tend to have higher relative contract change 
costs; and contract changes due to omissions in the contract are more present in 
smaller projects than in larger projects. The results of the analysis suggest among 
other things that policymakers and planners should pay more attention to flexible 
contracting, and to the contract management of smaller projects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Research has revealed that the implementation of transportation infrastructure 
projects worldwide is characterized by cost overruns (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & 
Rothengatter, 2003; Odeck, 2004; Skamris Holm & Flyvbjerg, 1997). The 
Netherlands are no exception (Cantarelli, 2011; Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg & Buhl, 2012; 
Cantarelli, Molin, Van Wee & Flyvbjerg, 2012; Cantarelli, Van Wee, Molin & 
Flyvbjerg, 2012). These studies have inquired into the effect of project type, project 
size, the length of project implementation and geographical location on cost 
overruns. It was found that for the Netherlands, amongst other things, cost overrun is 
most severe for road projects, and more severe for smaller projects than for larger 
projects (Cantarelli, Van Wee, Molin & Flyvbjerg, 2012). Such findings provide 
important patterns that can be used in the procurement of future projects: Flyvbjerg 
(2006; 2007) and Flyvbjerg, Garbuio and Lovallo (2009) stressed how these patterns 
can be used for reference class forecasting to curb strategic misinterpretation and 
overoptimistic biases in policymaking and planning for future projects. For example, 
Cantarelli, Van Wee, Molin & Flyvbjerg (2012) showed that Dutch road projects have 
an average cost overrun of 18.6%, and this finding can inform transport 
infrastructure policymakers and planners about the possibility that – and the possible 
extent to which – their planned project costs may be too low. 
An important explanation for cost overruns that is adduced in the literature is 
contract changes and extensions relative to what was laid down in the contract 
between the principal and the construction contractor. After the conclusion of 
construction contracts, i.e. in the implementation phase, contracts often need to be 
changed or extended so as to respond to changing conditions and uncertainty in the 
context of the project (cf. Verweij & Gerrits). As Badenfelt puts it: “given that future 
aspects of work can never be fully predicted or described, […] contracts [are] […], 
irrespective of their complexity and sophistication, […] by nature incomplete” (2011, 
p.568). According to Olsson (2006), studies have showed that the changes and 
extensions are one of the key contributors to cost overruns of projects. Unsurprisingly 
then, research has been conducted into the sizes and reasons for contract changes 
(e.g. Alnuaimi, Taha, Al Mohsin & Al-Harthi, 2010; Cox, Morris, Rogerson & Jared, 
1999; Hsieh, Lu & Wu, 2004; Ibbs, 1997; Taylor, Uddin, Goodrum, McCoy & Shan, 
2012). In a review of literature, Sun and Meng (2009) show that a wide variety of 
reasons has been identified and that the literature is characterized by a wide variety 
of taxonomies to characterize these reasons. Some single studies identified as many 
as 80 different reasons, ranging from external (e.g. environmental, political and 
economic factors) to organizational (e.g. related to processes and people) and project-
internal (e.g. design and planning) causes. Most studies, however, originate from the 
United States and the United Kingdom, and studies into contract changes originating 
from Continental Europe are very few in numbers (Sun & Meng, 2009). 
The present paper offers a contribution by conducting an analysis of new 
empirical data into the size and reasons for contract changes and extensions in the 
Netherlands, as also suggested by Cantarelli, Van Wee, Molin and Flyvbjerg (2012). 
Given the sheer breadth of reason classifications in the literature, we make no 
attempt to conform to any of them. One of the reasons for the wide variety may be 
that different organizations or projects in different countries use different systems for 
classifying reasons. Most studies are single-country and based on project 
documentation and database records (Sun & Meng, 2009), which perhaps explains 
how these different classifications enter into the literature. In this respect, the present 
study is no exception. The data we analyze comes from Rijkswaterstaat, which is the 
major public procurer of transportation infrastructure projects in the Netherlands, 
and concerns 45 projects with a total construction contract value of more than € 8.5 
billion. Rijkswaterstaat uses a four-part classification of reasons for contract changes. 
We will conform to this classification because changing it will distort the actual 
meaning of the data and can lead to drawing wrong conclusions. Our analysis is thus 
empirically-driven, but we believe that the analysis can still provide planners of 
transportation infrastructure projects with insights as to where additional project 
costs can be expected (e.g. Motawa, Anumba & El-Hamalawi, 2006). 
Contract changes can be problematic for public planners of transportation 
infrastructure projects as they can result in cost overruns of projects. Ways through 
which policymakers and planners try to mitigate the size of contract changes include 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) and innovative ways of transportation 
infrastructure procurement (e.g. Commissie Private Financiering van Infrastructuur, 
2008). The idea of public-private partnerships, for instance, is that by making the 
private contractor integrally responsible for the design, construction, and/or finance 
and maintenance of the project, optimizations can be achieved between these 
elements, resulting in inter alia less expensive contracts for governments. However, it 
is suggested that despite the PPP and innovative contracting efforts of public 
procurers, the realized gain at the contract closure between the government and the 
contractor is often impaired or lost due to contract changes in the implementation of 
the project. One hypothesized explanation is that contractors try to recover their 
reduction of the bid profit – they accept this reduction to win the contract – by 
claiming additional work after the contract award (Mohamed, Khoury & Hafez, 2011), 
an argument that can be traced back to the 1960’s Banwell Report and before (see 
Holt, Olomolaiye & Harris, 1995). “Especially in a competitive bidding scheme and 
public funded projects, it is not unusual for contractors to bid low on a project and 
hope to recover the loss through negotiations or claims” (Ho & Liu, 2004, p.94). 
Policymakers and planners of Dutch transportation infrastructure projects 
sometimes also have this presumption, although they cannot or do not substantiate 
this with analyses of real data. Using the Rijkswaterstaat data, we explore if we can 
find evidence for this presumption. 
In this paper then, the following two questions are answered: (1) is there a 
relation between lower bids by contractors and the size of contract changes and (2) 
what are the sizes of and reasons for contract changes in transportation 
infrastructure projects? The paper is further structured as follows. Section 2 briefly 
describes the data collection and the project selection. Section 3 provides the data 
and the operationalization of the data. In Section 4 we first look into the relationship 
between lower contractor bids and the size of contract changes and extensions. 
Thereafter, in Section 5 we break the analysis of contract changes down into the 
different reasons for contract changes, thus addressing the second question. Section 6 
comprises the conclusions and the discussion and defines some areas for further 
research. 
 
2. Data-collection and project selection 
 
Rijkswaterstaat is the executive agency of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and 
the Environment that is responsible for the main transportation network. 
Rijkswaterstaat employs around 9,000 people and has an annual turnover of 
approximately € 5 billion. It manages over 4,500 km of highways, nearly 2,800 
viaducts, 23 tunnels and nearly 750 bridges (Rijkswaterstaat, 2012; 2013). It is the 
procurer of major transportation infrastructure in the Netherlands. Since 2010/2011, 
Rijkswaterstaat integrated all its data about its projects into a single database. The 
data that are analyzed in this paper are derived from this database.  
Access to and publishing about the data was allowed, in consultation with 
Rijkswaterstaat and providing the projects are anonymized. Administrators of the 
project database and Rijkswaterstaat managers and experts were consulted during 
the research process and results of analyses were discussed with them, so as to 
increase the practical relevance of the study. Also, this increased the reliability of our 
analysis as we were able to discuss outliers and missing data. An additional advantage 
of this cooperation was that by analyzing data that are used by organizations in their 
management of transportation infrastructure projects, our research contributed to 
informed-evidence-based management practice, closing the gap between research 
and practice (Rousseau, 2006). As the project database is not designed to facilitate 
empirical, comparative research, considerable effort was required to prepare the data 
for analysis. Specifically, the data that were used in the present analyses were 
scattered across the database system, the projects contained many contract-ID’s that 
were created by project managers but not actually used to administer contract 
changes, and some contracts were allocated to a project but where not actually 
construction contracts and/or contained no data. 
The Rijkswaterstaat project database contained 46 projects for which a 
construction contract was concluded (i.e. contracts that have been signed) and for 
which Rijkswaterstaat is the main principal. As said, the conclusion of the 
construction contract marks the start of the implementation phase of a project. For 
this research we focus on the construction contract as this is the main contract in a 
transportation infrastructure project. This is also evident from the data: the total 
value of the construction contracts of the 46 projects is € 8,567.562 million (93.5%) 
whilst the total value of the other contracts (such as consultant hiring contracts and 
advertisement contracts) is € 600.396 million (6.5%); and the average construction 
contract has a value of € 122.393 million compared to € 0.931 million for the other 
contracts. After checking the data for extreme cases and outliers, it was decided to 
exclude one of the 46 projects from the analysis. This case concerns an extreme case, 
which has a contract value of € 3.899 million and a total value of contract changes of 
€ 19.099 million. This is equivalent to nearly 490% of the contract value, which is 
well above the average (see Section 3). After checking with Rijkswaterstaat, it was 
found that this concerns a project in which an emergency situation occurred. 
Consequently and in contrast to the other 45 projects, a contract was rapidly made 
and closed with a construction company so as to quickly respond to the situation, in 
the knowledge that the contract would be extended considerably thereafter. No 
standard procurement and decision-making process was gone through. Besides the 
extreme case, one case appeared to be an outlier having a contract value of € 17.279 
million and a total value of contract changes of € 20.429 million. This is equivalent to 
nearly 120% of the contract value. No substantial reason validated the exclusion of 
this case and statistically the analyses with and without the case led to similar 
patterns and results; the outlier has therefore been included in the analyses.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
Our analysis is based on quantitative cross-sectional data that were available for the 
projects. The majority of the 45 projects are road projects (84.44%) or partly road 
projects (8.88%), and the majority of projects has a Design and Construct (D&C) 
contract (68.89%). Other project types were bridges and tunnels; other contract types 
were Design, Build, Finance and Maintain (DBFM), traditional contracts (RAW) and 
Alliances. DBFM is a form of public-private partnership. It is a long-term 
concessional contract where the contractor is made integrally responsible for 
designing, building, partly financing and maintaining the infrastructure (e.g. Grimsey 
& Lewis, 2004). 
The data are measured at January 1st 2014. First, for 36 projects information is 
available about the value of the contract that Rijkswaterstaat estimated prior to the 
tender.1 We refer to this as the ‘procurement estimation’. The procurement 
estimation is an indicator of the bids that Rijkswaterstaat expected the contractors to 
submit. Second, the initial contract value, as Rijkswaterstaat coins it, is the value of 
the contract that was eventually concluded between Rijkswaterstaat and the 
contractor. We refer to this simply as the ‘contract value’. We calculated the 
difference between the procurement estimation and the contract value for the 
projects, which we use as a proxy for the lower bids by contractors. We refer to this as 
the ‘procurement result’. The ‘relative procurement result’ for each project is then 
calculated by dividing the procurement result by the procurement estimation. Third, 
                                                          
1 Projects for which procurement data were missing (in 6 cases) or inaccurate (as the type of contract 
changed after the procurement estimation – in 3 cases) could not be included in the analysis. 
quantitative data were available about the sizes and reasons for the ‘contract changes’ 
in the implementation of the project. The size of contract changes refers to either the 
number of contract changes or the value of contract changes. To be able to compare 
the cases for their relative size of contract changes, in the analyses the ‘relative 
contract changes’ in terms of value is used. Specifically, per construction contract a 
list of contract changes was available, including information about the size of each 
contract change and the reason for each contract change. This list contained all the 
contract changes that occurred from the moment that the contract was concluded (i.e. 
the signing of the contract) up to January 1st 2014. Regarding the size of the contract 
changes it should be noted that a contract change does not necessarily have costs 
associated with it. Regarding the reasons for the contract changes, Rijkswaterstaat 
identifies four possible reasons (Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2005): (1) 
omissions in the original contract, (2) technically necessary changes, (3) changes in 
laws and regulations, and (4) scope changes (cf. Sun & Meng, 2009). The definitions 
of these reasons are provided in Table 1, as well as the definitions of the other 
variables that are the focus of the analysis. The operationalization is derived from the 
project database and from internal documents of Rijkswaterstaat. The descriptive 
statistics of the cross-sectional data are provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 1: the operationalization of the variables 
Variables Unit Description 
Procurement 
estimation (PE) 
k€ The value of the construction contract(s) of the project 
expected by Rijkswaterstaat prior to the tender. 
Contract value 
(CV) 
k€ The value of the construction contract(s) of the project at 
contract closure between Rijkswaterstaat and the 
contractor. 
Procurement 
result (PR) 
k€ The difference between the procurement estimation and 
the construction contract value. 
Relative 
procurement 
result (RPR) 
% Dividing the procurement result by the procurement 
estimation. 
Contract 
changes (CC) 
N The number of the contract changes after the closure of the 
construction contract(s). 
k€ The value of the contract changes after the closure of the 
construction contract(s). 
Relative contract 
changes (RCC) 
% Dividing the value of contract changes by the contract 
value. 
Omissions (OM)  Omissions are changes that have to be made in/to the 
contract because the contract appeared incomplete, 
unclear, or contained incorrect or conflicting contract 
terms. 
N The number of the contract changes due to omissions in the 
contract. 
k€ The value of the contract changes due to omissions in the 
contract. 
Technical 
necessities 
(TECH) 
 Technical necessities are changes in the physical and/or 
technical conditions under which the project is being 
implemented (e.g. changes in the ground conditions or the 
availability of materials), requiring additional work so as to 
finish the project. 
N The number of the contract changes due to technically 
necessary changes. 
k€ The value of the contract changes due to technically 
necessary changes. 
Laws and 
regulations 
(LAW) 
 This concerns changes that occur in laws and regulations 
that require stricter requirements, so that the contract may 
have to be changed to meet these requirements. 
N The number of the contract changes due to changes in laws 
and regulations. 
k€ The value of the contract changes due to changes in laws 
and regulations. 
Scope (SCO)  Here the scope of the contracted work is extended with the 
purpose to achieve e.g. a faster completion of the project, 
cost advantages, reducing traffic obstructions and logistic 
advantages. 
N The number of the contract changes due to scope changes. 
k€ The value of the contract changes due to scope changes. 
 
Table 2: procurement estimation, contract value and contract changes 
 N Min. Max. Mean St. Dev. 
Procurement estimation (k€) 36 1,184 867,434 157,890.75 194,954 
      
Contract value (k€) 45 1,184 1,454,948 190,303.62 347,771 
      
Procurement result (k€) 36 -5,100 350,200 46,540.97 78,278 
      
Contract changes (numbers) 45 1 407 62.31 85.36 
Omissions 45 0 107 7.13 18.16 
Scope 45 0 216 25.49 43.61 
Technical necessities 45 0 89 17.16 25.82 
Laws and regulations 45 0 25 1.78 4.47 
      
Contract changes (k€) 45 0 225,530 25,452 45,581 
Omissions 45 0 36,339 1,416 5,506 
Scope 45 0 128,090 14,609 28,302 
Technical necessities 45 0 55,293 6,578 12,645 
Laws and regulations 45 0 96,233 2,849 14,452 
      
Relative contract changes (%) 45 0 118.20 22.37 24.48 
Relative omissions 45 0 63.85 2.66 10.08 
Relative scope 45 0 84.05 11.23 17.40 
Relative technical necessities 45 0 45.02 7.84 10.94 
Relative laws and regulations 45 0 11.93 0.65 2.10 
 
The mean procurement estimation of the projects is k€ 157,891. The total 
contract value of the 45 projects is € 8,563.663 million (i.e. over € 8.5 billion) with a 
mean of k€ 190,304. The mean procurement result is k€ 46,541.2 The total number of 
contract changes is 2804 (with a mean of 62.31) with a total value of € 1,145.351 
million (i.e. over € 1.1 billion) and a mean of k€ 25,452. Table 2 also shows that the 
mean relative contract change costs is 22.37%. This number shows the mean score of 
the relative contract change costs for the 45 projects. 
Table 2 further provides the descriptive statistics for the different reasons for 
contract changes. But before analyzing those in Section 5, the next section first 
addresses the first research question, enquiring into the relationship between the 
procurement result and the value of the contract changes, so as to see if evidence can 
be found for the presumption that contractors try to recover their reduction of the bid 
profit. In Section 5 the analysis of contract changes is broken down into the different 
reasons for contract changes. 
 
4. Do higher procurement results have more contract changes? 
 
To test whether there is a relation between lower bids by contractors and the size of 
contract changes, we used the relative procurement result of the projects as defined 
in Table 1. In Table 3 the statistics for the 36 projects are provided. 
 
Table 3: statistics for the relative procurement result 
 N Min. Max. Mean St. 
Dev. 
Skewness 
(SE) 
Kurtosis 
(SE) 
        
Relative 
procurement result 
36 -19.51 58.58 23.78 19.72 -0.03 (.39) -.76 (.77) 
 
The relative procurement result shows a normal distribution. As it concerns a 
small sample, we used the Shapiro-Wilk test to test for normality, which was found 
not significant (p = 0.33), meaning that the distribution does not significantly differs 
from a normal distribution. The average relative procurement result is nearly 24%. 
This means that for the average project the value of the construction contract 
expected by Rijkswaterstaat prior to the tender is almost a quarter higher than the 
value of the construction contract after contract closure. Or in other words: the value 
                                                          
2 The mean contract value for the 36 projects of which procurement estimation data are available is k€ 
111,349.80. The mean procurement result of k€ 46,540.97 can be calculated by subtracting the mean 
contract value of the 36 projects from the mean procurement estimation. 
for which projects are contracted is almost a quarter lower than Rijkswaterstaat 
calculated. Following the assumption in the literature (e.g. Mohamed, Khoury & 
Hafez, 2011), this could indicate that the contractors bid lower to win the contract, to 
recover their reduction of the bid profit by claiming additional work after the contract 
award. To analyze whether there is a relationship between the relative contract 
changes and the relative procurement result, a Pearson’s correlation analysis was 
conducted. 
The resulting Pearson’s correlation of 0.07 suggests a very weak positive 
relationship between the relative contract changes and the relative procurement 
result. However, this relationship is not significant (p = 0.69). This means that we do 
not find evidence for the assumption of opportunistic contractors. In the next section 
we go deeper into the sizes and reasons for contract changes. 
 
5. Sizes and reasons of contract changes 
 
Going back to descriptive data in Table 2 it can be seen that the average project has a 
number of 62.31 contract changes. With a mean of 25.49, scope changes are the 
dominant reason for contract changes followed by technical necessities (17.16), 
omissions (7.13) and laws and regulations (1.78). The remaining 10.75 average 
contract changes per project are contract changes for which no reason was specified 
in the data. These remaining contract changes, though, have no costs associated with 
them and are therefore not of primary interests to us. Looking at the reasons for 
contract changes in terms of their contribution to the relative contract change costs of 
22.37%, the same pattern can be observed: scope changes are dominant (11.23), 
followed by technical necessities (7.84), omissions (2.66) and laws and regulations 
(0.65). 
Alternatively, looking at the values for the four reasons of contract changes, the 
pattern is somewhat different: laws and regulations involve on average more costs 
(k€ 2,849) than omissions (k€ 1,416); scope changes (k€ 14,609) and technical 
necessities (k€ 6,578) are still the most significant. Moreover, dividing the value of 
the contract changes by the number of contract changes (i.e. looking at the 2804 
instances of contract changes instead of the projects), the average laws and 
regulations contract change involves k€ 1,603 (i.e. 2,849 divided by 1.78), followed by 
scope (k€ 0,573), technical necessities (k€ 0,383) and omissions (k€ 0,198). Thus, in 
terms of the average contract change value, laws and regulations are the most 
expensive. This suggests that laws and regulations are not the most common of 
reasons for contract changes and extensions, but if they occur they can be of 
significant size.  
However, this does not take into account that, as indicated by the high standard 
deviations in Table 2 for laws and regulations and for omissions, the high average k€ 
value per laws and regulations contract change is caused by a few such contract 
changes which occurred in projects with a high contract value. It is important 
therefore to relate the different reasons for contract changes to the sizes of the 
respective projects. We therefore made groups of projects based on their contract 
value and based on their relative contract changes. The reasons for the contract 
changes amongst these groups are compared. 
To conduct this analysis, first it was examined if the projects show a normal 
distribution in terms of the relative contract change costs (i.e. the bottom rows in 
Table 2). This was not the case: the data were positively skewed (1.90) and the 
Shapiro-Wilk test was significant on the 1% level. Therefore it was decided to use the 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA test in the following analyses for comparing different groups 
of projects. This non-parametric test works with ranks. The lowest score in the data – 
including all groups – is given a rank of 1; the next lowest score is given a rank of 2, 
and so on. In case of similar scores (this is referred to as ties), average ranks are 
assigned. The tests are carried out on the ranks rather than the actual data (Conover 
& Iman, 1981; Field, 2009). The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA test calculates whether the 
mean ranks for the groups differ significantly.  
We performed analyses for two different groupings of the projects. The first 
clustering (Clustering-A) is constructed based on the sizes of the projects in terms of 
their contract values. We follow Cantarelli, Van Wee, Molin & Flyvbjerg (2012) and 
define the following groups: 
1. Small projects: a contract value of < € 50 million (N=21); 
2. Medium projects: a contract value of € 50 < 112.5 million (N=8); 
3. Large projects: a contract value of € 112.5 < 225 million (N=7); 
4. Very large projects: a contract value of > € 225 million (N=9). 
The second clustering (Clustering-B) emerged from the data and is constructed based 
on the relative contract changes of the projects. Based on the Q-Q Plot, four clusters 
of projects were identified: 
1. Low: projects with relative contract change costs of 0-7.47% (N=15); 
2. Medium: projects with relative contract change costs of 9.85-22.66% (N=15); 
3. High: projects with relative contract change costs of 29.29-40.87% (N=10); 
4. Very high: projects with relative contract change costs of 60.34-118.23% (N=5). 
These two groupings allow us to take into account the size of the projects (both in 
terms of the contract values and in terms of the total contract changes) when looking 
at the different reasons for the contract changes. These different categorical groups 
might result in relations that are not linear; relations for the substantially different 
groups can more specifically be analyzed. The differences between the four groups in 
both Clustering-A and -B are significant according to the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA test 
(0.00), which strengthens the case for the clustering. The statistics for Clustering-A 
are provided in Table 4 and the statistics for Clustering-B are provided in Table 5. 
 
Table 4: statistics for the relative contract change costs (Clustering-A) 
Group N Mean RCC St. Dev. Std. Error Min. Max. 
Group 1: small projects 21 26.04 29.43 6.42 0.00 118.23 
Group 2: medium projects 8 22.77 19.67 6.96 0.96 60.34 
Group 3: large projects 7 21.95 24.32 9.19 0.87 70.20 
Group 4: very large projects 9 13.78 15.16 5.05 0.00 40.87 
Total 45 22.37 24.48 3.65 0.00 118.23 
Table 5: statistics for the contract value (Clustering-B) 
Group N Mean CV St. Dev. St. Error Min. Max. 
Group 1: low 
RCC costs  
15 274,366.87 482,479.64 124,575.71 3,270.00 1,454,948.00 
Group 2: 
medium RCC 
costs 
15 187,788.80 325,459.71 84,033.33 5,112.00 1,310,789.00 
Group 3: high 
RCC costs 
10 136,322.00 194,438.68 61,486.91 2,375.00 644,481.00 
Group 4: very 
high RCC costs 
5 53,621.60 51,749.72 23,143.18 1,184.00 122,215.00 
Total 45 190,303.00 347,770.91 51,842.63 1,184.00 1,454,948.00 
 
Recall from Table 2 that the average project has k€ 25,452 contract change costs 
which amounts to 13.37% of the average contract value. However the relative 
percentage of contract change costs for the projects is substantially higher: 22.37%. 
This difference seems to support the findings of Cantarelli, Van Wee, Molin & 
Flyvbjerg (2012) who found that cost overruns in Dutch projects tend to be more 
severe for smaller projects than for larger projects. However, this relationship was 
not significant. We further examined this relationship between contract value and 
contract change costs. 
Looking at Table 4 it appears that smaller projects (Groups 1 to 3) indeed have 
higher contract change costs (with means from 22 to 26%) than larger projects 
(Group 4 with a mean of 13.78%). According to the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA the 
differences between the four groups are not significant (0.76). Interestingly, the 
groups in Table 5 seem to show a similar pattern: the mean contract value of Group 4 
is € 53.6 million, followed by Group 3 (€ 136.3 million), Group 2 (€ 187.8 million) 
and Group 1 (€ 274.4 million). This indicates that smaller projects indeed have higher 
contract change costs. However, the differences between these four groups are also 
not significant according to the Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA test (0.66) (cf. Cantarelli, Van 
Wee, Molin & Flyvbjerg, 2012). 
In addition to Clustering-A and -B, we also looked whether there are differences 
between different contract types, in particular between DBFM which is considered 
the favorable public-private partnership option by policymakers in the Netherlands 
(Commissie Private Financiering van Infrastructuur, 2008), and the other contract 
types. A glance at the five DBFM projects in our dataset shows an average contract 
change costs as a percentage of the contract value of 2.4% for the DBFM projects, 
which is considerably less than the 22.37% for the total of 45 projects. However, we 
argue that no bold conclusions can be made based on these figures. The projects are 
still being implemented and the final numbers are far from being known: DBFM 
contracts typically last for about 20-30 years.3 We now turn to the sizes and reasons 
for contract changes and extensions. 
                                                          
3 Of the 45 projects, 32 projects have been delivered, i.e. a completeness of 100%. For 2 projects, the 
project delivery dates were not available. The other 11 projects had an average completeness level (i.e. 
Tables 6 and 7 below show the mean share of the different reasons of contract 
changes for the four groups. For example, looking at Table 7 for Clustering-B, in 
Group 2 about 46.48% of the relative contract changes are caused by scope changes, 
whereas technical necessities take up 45.43%, laws and regulations 5.20% and 
omissions 2.88%. Overall, scope changes take up the biggest share of the relative 
contract changes (i.e. 43.45%), closely followed by technical necessities (40.78%). 
Omissions and laws and regulations only take up a small part of the relative contract 
changes (8.52% and 2.81% respectively). The data in the Tables 6 and 7 are depicted 
in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
Table 6: distribution of the different reasons for contract changes (Clustering-A) 
Groups N LAW SCO TECH OM 
Group 1: small projects 21 1.55 27.31 56.12 10.25 
Group 2: medium projects 8 1.07 67.68 20.22 11.04 
Group 3: large projects 7 2.29 38.89 50.96 7.85 
Group 4: very large projects 9 7.70 63.13 15.32 2.74 
Total 45 2.81 43.45 40.78 8.52 
 
Table 7: distribution of the different reasons for contract changes (Clustering-B) 
Groups N LAW SCO TECH OM 
Group 1: low RCC costs 15 .00 34.44 41.56 10.66 
Group 2: medium RCC costs 15 5.20 46.48 45.43 2.88 
Group 3: high RCC costs 10 4.84 52.21 38.52 4.43 
Group 4: very high RCC costs 5 .01 43.89 28.96 27.14 
Total 45 2.81 43.45 40.78 8.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
dividing the number of months from contract closure up to January 1st 2014 by the planned delivery 
dates) of 61%. We tested whether the level of completeness is significantly different for the four groups 
of both clusters (using Kruskal-Wallis). This was not the case. 
Figure 1: distribution of the different reasons for contract changes (Clustering-A) 
 
 
Figure 2: distribution of the different reasons for contract changes (Clustering-B) 
 
 
It was tested whether there are significant differences between the groups with 
regard to the reasons for contract changes. For Clustering-A, the Kruskal-Wallis 
ANOVA test returned two significant relationships. The groups are different with 
regard to technical necessities (p < 0.05) and with regard to scope (p < 0.05). 
Looking at Figure 1, it cannot be said that contract change costs due to technical 
necessities and scope changes increase with project size, because the similar patterns 
of Groups 1 and 3 differ from the similar patterns of Groups 2 and 4. Looking at the 
diagrams in Figure 1, it does seems that contract changes due to omissions play a 
bigger role in smaller projects than in larger projects. That is, the very large projects 
(Group 4) have fewer omissions than the other three groups but this relationship 
appeared to be not significant. For Clustering-B, the test returned one significant 
relationship: the groups are different with regard to laws and regulations (p < 0.05). 
Again, looking at Figure 2, the similar patterns of Groups 1 and 4 differ from the 
similar patterns of Groups 2 and 3 with regard to changes due to laws and 
regulations. Thus, although some significant relations were found, they are not linear. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this article, the aim was to empirically explore if we could find evidence in the data 
for a relationship between lower bids by contractors and the size of contract changes, 
and to explore the size and reasons for contract changes as there are few Continental 
European empirical studies on this matter. Before presenting the conclusions, we 
first mention the limitations of the study. First, there is the relative small sample size, 
which partly explains the relatively low number of significant relationships and the 
rather descriptive nature of the study. It is hard to get big datasets in this field of 
research, and we encourage future research to make the effort. The cooperation with 
Rijkswaterstaat in building this dataset has at least provided a dataset. In such 
databases with a small amount of unique cases, standard deviations can be quite 
high. Therefore, the standard deviations were reported throughout the empirical 
sections, and the analyses, when possible, were based on relative values such as the 
relative contract changes and relative procurement results. Second, the fact is that 
several projects in the dataset are still being implemented. This means that for some 
projects probably more contract change costs could be incurred in the future, 
especially in the case of long-term contracts such as DBFM that typically last for 
several decades. An area for future research, requiring additional data collection, is to 
analyze a larger set of concluded transportation infrastructure projects so as to test if 
there is a relationship between the procurement result and the value of contract 
changes in the project implementation. However, we believe that, within the 
constraints of this research, we can draw some meaningful conclusions. 
In the introduction we set out to answer two questions. The first one is as 
follows: is there a relationship between lower bids by contractors and the size of 
contract changes? Based on the analysis of the relationship between the procurement 
result (i.e. the difference between the procurement estimate and the contract value) 
and the value of the contract changes, we conclude that there is no evidence for the 
presumption that contractors try to recover the reduction of the bid profit by claiming 
contract changes in the implementation of the project. This also raises the question as 
to whether the assumption is correct in the first place that it is the behavior of 
contractors that causes the differences between the contract value and the 
procurement estimation. An area for future research is the qualitative investigation as 
to how and why certain procurement estimates are arrived at, not only by 
contractors, but also by principals. One factor that could further influence the 
creation of certain procurement estimates is, for instance, innovations in 
transportation infrastructure procurement and contracting. Because of data 
limitations we have not been able to study this relationship, but we suggest that it is 
an interesting avenue for future research, especially because policymakers and 
planners of infrastructure expect these innovations to lower project costs. 
The second question was: what are the sizes of and reasons for contract changes 
in transportation infrastructure projects? Having distinguished between four types of 
reasons – i.e. omissions, scope changes, technical necessities, and laws and 
regulations – and having analyzed the total of 2804 contract changes in the 45 
projects, three conclusions are drawn. First, both in terms of the number of contract 
changes and their value, scope changes are the most significant reason of contract 
changes in transportation infrastructure projects, closely followed by technical 
necessities; laws and regulations are the least significant reason of contract changes. 
However, if present, they can entail large costs. Second, it was also found that 
projects with a relative high value of contract changes tend to be the smaller projects. 
Third, in the smaller projects, omissions take a bigger share as compared to the larger 
projects. 
The results indicate first and foremost the important contribution of scope 
changes (and technical necessities) in the contract change costs of infrastructure 
projects. Infrastructure projects are inherently complex, which means that contracts 
cannot foresee all eventualities in implementation (Verweij & Gerrits, 2014; 
Badenfelt, 2011). This finding draws our attention to the importance of devising more 
flexible contractual arrangements between contractors and principals. Indeed, scope 
changes and technical necessities (and also laws and regulations) are reasons for 
contract changes that are at least partly outside the sphere of influence of projects. 
Flexible contracts which have explicitly incorporated in them the possibilities that 
e.g. project implementation plans can be changed (scope changes) or that the 
conditions under which projects are implemented change (technical necessities) may 
be well capable of dealing with these uncertainties (e.g. Cruz & Marques, 2013). 
DBFM contracts are considered an attractive option by policymakers and planners of 
infrastructure projects (e.g. Commissie Private Financiering van Infrastructuur, 
2008) and the data seem to indicate that DBFM contracts have indeed lower contract 
change costs. Although these projects are still being implemented and the final 
numbers are not yet known because the DBFM contracts typically last for about 20-
30 years, the figures suggest that DBFM contracts may be better able to deal with 
changing project conditions, resulting in fewer contract changes. Tempered 
enthusiasm is appropriate here, however (Reynaers & Verweij, 2014): only few DBFM 
transportation infrastructure projects are being (and have been) implemented in the 
Netherlands thus far, and more research has to be conducted into them. 
The implication of the second conclusion is that, although the attention of 
policymakers and planners of infrastructure projects tends to go to the large, 
mediagenic (either in a good or a bad way) projects, more contract change costs (as 
percentages of the contract value) might be expected from the smaller projects (cf. 
Cantarelli, Van Wee, Molin & Flyvbjerg, 2012). In these smaller projects, and this is 
implied from the third conclusion, especially omissions in the contracts seem to 
contribute to the contract change costs. This pattern could be indicative of public 
procurers putting less means and expertise in the drafting of high-quality, omissions-
free contracts in smaller projects than in larger projects. This was confirmed by 
experts within Rijkswaterstaat. The less experienced managers are often assigned to 
smaller projects as these are less complex and less risky, which provides these 
managers with an easier environment to develop more skills and experience. 
Although this is understandable, perhaps smaller projects are entitled to a bit more 
attention from their principals. 
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